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Property in the Welfare State
I. Introduction
A primary goal of the welfare state is to promote individual dignity
by guaranteeing a decent standard of living for all. The individual's
ability to achieve a sense of self-worth turns on the opportunity to
participate in, and contribute to, society in a meaningful fashion.
Achievement of such goals is seriously undermined for those who
do not have their basic needs guaranteed; shelter, food, health, and
education are vital interests of the individual which, if not available
in sufficient quantity or quality, hamper or make impossible the
opportunity to achieve self-dignity and respect. The instruments for
guaranteeing the substratum of support in a welfare state can be
multilayered and variegated in nature. Ideally, all individuals would
be able to look after their own needs by having access to work.
However, it is clear that no modem society has ever been able to
guarantee productive jobs for all. There are many who cannot work,
such as the young, the infirm, and the elderly. During processes of
rapid change, workers are forced out of jobs because they possess
skills which are not readily adaptable to new environments,
processes, and technologies.
The decline of the family as a support structure is intertwined
with the growth of the modern welfare state as the primary source of
support for individuals who are not able to care for their own
needs.' In providing for these needs, the state is fulfilling the
expectations, held by individuals, that the state itself has helped to
create. 2 To achieve its goal, the state must act as a redistributor of
wealth. Thus, one of the underlying imperatives of the welfare state
is to work towards a greater sense of equality among individuals. It
*Assistant Professor of Law, Carleton University, Ottawa.
1. M. Glendon, The New Family and the New Property 111 (1981).
2. This may in many ways be a self-fulfilling function: the state created the
expectations when it initiated its social welfare programs, and those expectations
have been transformed into rights. The term "rights" is used in the sense suggested
by Dworkin. It would be wrong for the government to deny to individuals those
things to which they have rights, even though it would be in the general interest to
do so (R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977)).
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is a trite observation to state that we are not all born equal. We are
the products of different cultures, having differing intelligence,
looks, and talents. However, these innate inequalities should not
provide the basis for justifying an unequal distribution of rights to
respect and a share of resources. 3 If there does exist a present
inequality, as there clearly does in Canada, 4 the state's attempt to
reduce such inequality means that, in serving those with the greater
need, the state must deny some an opportunity to accumulate greater
wealth. One of the knotty problems that must be solved is the extent
to which the state can interfere with the existing distribution of
property:
The concept of property, the way in which it is legally defined
and the extent to which it is legally, socially and politically
protected raise immediately the most fundamental problems of
political philosophy and social life - the relationship between
the individual and his social environment, between citizens and
the State - in modern society - between the personal and the
commercial.5
There is an internal tension between the rights to property and the
rights of individuals to a fair share of the resources which guarantee
the necessities of life. The tension must be examined in more detail
in any attempt to resolve the conflict. Thus, this paper will
undertake a brief excursus on our notions of property and the extent
and ways in which the law has protected property rights. Concepts
of "new property" will be looked at as a means of reconciling the
3. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971), in which it is argued that there must be
equality of rights to liberty and equal opportunity of access to offices and work.
Departures from the equality of distribution of wealth are justified to the extent that
basic equality of liberty and opportunity are not impinged upon, and only if such
departure is to the advantage of the least well-off group in society. This, then,
provides an incentive to those with special unearned gifts to use them to benefit
both themselves and those less well-off. This may still lead to gross inequalities of
distribution. Thus, special emphasis must be placed on creating the equal
opportunities envisioned. The institutions of the state must be so structured as to
guarantee equal access to education and assure minimum standards of well-being,
so that individuals are not overwhelmed by the mere struggle for survival. Those
who would place self-respect higher on the scale of desirable goals might want to
establish a more egalitarian society (N. Furniss, T. Tilton, The Case for the
Welfare State 27 (1977)).
4. See, for example, Gillespie, I., The Redistribution of Income in Canada (1980).
5. Tay, "Property and Law in the Society of Mass Production, Mass Consumption
and Mass Allocation", in A Revolution in Our Age, The Transformation of Law,
Justice and Morals 19 (1975).
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tension. The paper will look at specific developments in
landlord-tenant and employment law to demonstrate the changing
nature of legal protection for vital interests.
II. Property in the Welfare State
The first question to be asked is what the nature of property is. The
answer may differ, depending on whether it is given by a layman, a
philosopher, an economist, or a lawyer. For the layman, the concept
of property is intimately linked with ownership. Property is a
"thing" which can be owned. Ownership involves, as the layman
might perceive it, the rights to control the thing free of restrictions
or obligations to another. The layman is thus interested in
identifying who the owner of the property is, and will speak of
ownership of property as the right to be free of interference from
nonowners, be it other individuals or government. For the
economist, property rights serve as a mechanism to delimit
alternatives open to choice-making individuals in a society.
6
Viewed another way, the "owner" of property possesses the
consent of fellow citizens to permit him or her to act in particular
ways. 7 This concept of property rights is very broad and enables the
economist to speak of the right not to be injured by the negligent
conduct of another or the right to pollute as property rights. The
allocation of property rights is of great interest to the economist in
determining whether it promotes the most efficient use of resources.
The growth of studies in economics and law 8 is fuelled by an
underlying belief that the distribution of legal rights should be
designed to promote the most efficient use of scarce resources. 9
6. Stubblebine, "On Property Rights and Institutions", in G. Tullock, ed.,
Explorations in the Theory of Anarchy 39 (1972).
7. Demsetz, "Toward a Theory of Property Rights" (1967), 57 Am. Ec. Rev.
Proceedings 347.
8. For recent works on economics and property law, see B. Ackerman, ed.,
Economic Foundations of Property Law (1975): Manne, H., The Economics of
Legal Relationships: Readings in the Theory of Property Rights (1975).
9. Efficiency is defined by Posner in terms of wealth maximization, which draws
on concepts of the Kantian tradition of individual autonomy, as well as on
principles of utilitarianism. One means of testing whether or not there is an efficient
allocation is to determine if there is a state of Pareto optimality. If it is not possible
to change a particular equilibrium without making at least one person worse off
than previously, then the allocation is efficient. That, of course, still leaves the
question of whether a particular distribution is just. See Posner, R., Economic
Analysis of Law (2nd ed., 1977); Posner,R., The Economics of Justice (198 I).
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One of the first principles a student of the law of property has
drummed into his or her consciousness is that there is no such thing
as absolute ownership of property:
Instead of defining the relationship between a person and "his"
things, property law discusses the relationships that arise between
people with respect to things. More precisely the law of property
considers the way rights to use things may be parceled out among
a host of competing resource users. Each resource user is
conceived as holding a bundle of rights vis-h-vis other potential
users; indeed in the American system, the ways in which user
rights may be legally packaged and distributed are wondrously
diverse. And it is probably never true that the law assigns to any
single person the right to use any thing in absolutely any way he
pleases. Hence it risks serious confusion to identify any particular
individual as the owner of any particular thing. 10
What types of rights are being spoken of here? If there is no such
thing as an owner, why, then, do even lawyers talk about the
"owners" of property?
The traditional difference between the economist and the lawyer
in the use of the term "property" is that the former used it in respect
to any relationship having an exchange value, while the latter used it
to denote legal relations between persons, with respect to a thing.
The thing could be either an object having physical existence or it
could be any kind of an intangible, such as a patent right or a chose
in action." The recent development of law and economics studies
has, however, tended to lead to a greater uniformity of approach by
lawyers and economists. 12Although the law does not recognize such
a creature as the absolute owner, it compares the bundles of rights
which persons may have vis-a-vis each other and designates the
person with the greatest bundle or with the bundle containing certain
10. Ackerman, B., Private Property and the Constitution (1977).
11. American Law Institute, I Restatement of the Law of Property 3 (1936).
12. See Calabresi and Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienabil-
ity: One View of the Cathedral (1972), 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089. These
commentators write of entitlements and the various ways in which the state can
protect them: property rights protect entitlements to the extent that someone who
wishes to remove the entitlement must buy it in a voluntary transaction; liability
rules protect an entitlement whenever persons are forced to compensate in
accordance with an objectively determined value if they have destroyed an initial
entitlement; an entitlement is inalienable to the extent that its transfer is not
permitted between a willing buyer and a willing seller. Thus, the state must
determine both who has the initial entitlement and how it is to be protected.
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key rights as the owner.1 3 It may still be difficult to decide whether
a person is an owner. 14 For our purposes, it is sufficient to realize
that there are a variety of rights which can be defined as property
rights, and the extent to which these are protected will have a direct
bearing on the mechanisms that will be used by the state to
distribute wealth and on the extent to which this will be
accomplished.
This paper will not undertake an extensive analysis of the
justification for property rights 15  or of the anti-property
arguments.1 6 What does bear examination, however, is the conflict
between property rights and other fundamental rights. The extent to
which one can claim a right to protection of property interests will
have a crucial impact on such other rights as equality, liberty,
freedom of speech, and association. Furthermore, there is the
underlying question of whether or not one is entitled to the wealth
that may be generated from the arbitrary, unmerited, random
13. Honor6 characterizes the standard incidents of ownership as (1) the right to
possess; (2) the right to use; (3) the right to manage; (4) the right to income;
(5) the right to the capital; (6) the right to security; (7) the incident of
transmissibility; (8) the incidence of absence of term; (9) the prohibition of
harmful use; and (10) liability to execution. See Honor6, "Ownership", in A. G.
Guest, ed., Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence. Of these, the last two incidents are
limits on the right of ownership while the right to security is the means of protecting
the other five rights. Thus, if one has any of these five rights and the right to
security, then one can be said to have a property right. See Becker, "The Moral
Basis of Property Rights", in J. Pennock and J. Chapman, eds., Property: Nomos
XXII 187 (1980).
14. See, for example, Bird Construction Co. Ltd. v. Ownix Developments Ltd., et
al (1981), 33 0. R. (2d) 807 (C.A.), on deciding whether a company, following a
complicated series of transactions, could be designated as the owner of a building
in accordance with the Mechanics' Lien Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 261.
15. For a recent treatment of the subject, see Becker, L., Property Rights:
Philosophical Foundations (1977). Becker considers that there are three types of
maintainable arguments justifying property rights: (1) labour theory of property
acquisition; (2) arguments from utility; and (3) an argument from political liberty.
He dismisses an argument based on first occupancy, so that the claim that "1 am
entitled because I had it first" is not maintainable. For a criticism of Becker's
approach, see Flatham, "On the alleged Impossibility of an Unqualified
Disjustificatory Theory of Property Rights", in J. Pennock, J. Chapman, eds.,
Property: Nomos XXII 221 (1980).
16. J. J. Rousseau, Discourse on the Origins and Foundations of Inequality
Among Men; P. Proudhon, What is Property?; H. George, Progress and Poverty;
K. Marx, Capital: A Critical Analysis of Capitalist Production.
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distribution of wealth-creating endowments such as talent, beauty,
and intelligence.
At one end of the range of attitudes regarding property rights is
the libertarian argument, exemplified by Nozick's claim that,
insofar as a particular distribution of holdings is property generated,
there is no argument for an extensive state with a mandate for
redistribution. 17 Furthermore, although advantages in natural assets
may be undeserved and arbitrary, individuals are nevertheless
entitled to such assets and therefore to any holdings acquired
through the use of such assets, despite any gross inequality that may
arise from such a distribution.' 8 Towards the other end of the range
of attitudes are those who, without calling for complete equality,
argue that equality must be given greater weight. Thus Rawls'
maximin principle states that inequalities are permitted only when
they maximize or at least contribute to the long-term expectations of
the least fortunate group in society. 19 Equality of opportunity and of
basic rights and duties is an equilibrium that rational individuals are
likely to choose in a situation where they are unaware of the
distribution of natural assets, that is, if they were choosing from
behind a veil of ignorance. Undeserved inequalities call for redress,
and inequalities of birth and natural endowment, being undeserved,
cannot serve as the basis for a claim to an unequal distribution of
property. 20 Finally, there are those who would give greater weight
to the claim of equality. They argue that a much greater equality of
distribution than that demanded by Rawls is required if power is not
to become unduly concentrated, to the detriment of rights to respect
and dignity.
Clearly, equality has a strong claim as a fundamental value
worthy of protection; at the least it is a means of guaranteeing
individual autonomy. To the extent that property rights are
permitted to infringe on claims to equality, there is justifiable
concern about the ranking of property rights in a hierarchy of
fundamental values. One demonstration of the way in which rights
to property may conflict with what others perceive to be
fundamental rights is the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada
17. Nozick, R., Anarchy, State and Utopia 230 (1974).
18. Ibid, at pp. 213-227.
19. J. Rawls, supra, note 3.
20. Ibid, at pp. 100-107. For an application of this principle to contractual
analysis, see Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice (1980), 89 Yale L.J.
472.
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in Harrison v. Carswell.21 In that case, an employee, while on a
lawful strike against one of the tenants of the shopping centre,
picketed peacefully on the sidewalk in front of the tenant's
premises. The owner of the shopping centre brought a charge
against the picketer under the Manitoba Petty Trespass Act. 22 The
issue was whether the private character of the ownership of the
shopping centre was justification for prohibiting the carrying out of
what would clearly be a legitimate activity if done on public
property. Dickson J., speaking for the majority, emphasized that
"Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence has traditionally recognized, as a
fundamental freedom, the right of an individual to the enjoyment of
property, and the right not to be deprived thereof, or any interest
therein, save by due process of law." This prevented Dickson from
finding that a person would be privileged to enter the shopping
centre against the owner's will in order to conduct an otherwise
permitted activity which was necessary to enhance the right to
associate and bargain through a union.
Laskin, in a dissenting opinion, would have found that the
defendant was entitled to a privilege of entry to carry on as she did
in the quasi-public areas of the shopping centre. To determine the
issue on the basis of the property rights of the owner presupposed
the content of those rights. Instead, those rights should have been
examined. They are a creature of the state and its laws, and whether
it makes sense to decide that the owner has the same rights to
prevent trespass in the twentieth century as he did in the eighteenth
century should have been the matter of extensive consideration. 23
The danger is that ownership of property may become the
precondition to the exercise of other rights. What is the value of
freedom of speech if the only place where it might be effective is put
out of bounds by the owner of the property who retains residual
21. (1975), 62 D.L.R. (3d) 68 (S.C.C.).
22. R.S.M. 1970, c. P-50.
23. Manitoba amended its Petty Trespass Act to overrule the Supreme Court
decision (S.M. 1976, s. 87 s 2); British Columbia Labour Code, R.S.B.C. 1979, c.
212, s. 87, provides that no action lies in respect of picketing permitted under the
act for trespass to real property to which members of the public ordinarily have
access. In Bramlea Ltd. v. Stevens (1979), 80 C.L.L.C. 14,019 (Sask. Q.B.), it
was held that, in the absence of a statute making trespassing an offence, no action
can be maintained in trespass for a person entering a shopping mall. See also
Grosvenor Park Shopping Centre Limited v. Waloshin et al (1964), 49 W.W.R.
237; 64 C.L.L.C. 14,008.
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discretion to bar certain members of the public whose views he does
not want publicly aired?
24
Another aspect of property rights as a barrier to the full
realization of other values is apparent when one speaks of the right
to hold property free of expropriation, unless there is compensation.
While there is much to be said for the protection of the individual
from injury by the state through the taking of property, it becomes
very difficult to define those situations where compensation should
be required and those where it should not. 25 Justification for
compensation may be based on political pragmatism, economic
efficiency, or concepts of moral relations between the individual
and the state. 26 In Canada, we have not embedded a right to
compensation as part of the Constitution. Statutory protection is
provided to owners of land through expropriation statutes enacted
throughout the country. 27 Other types of property have less
protection. Unless a statute clearly states otherwise, the courts will
construe the statute so as to entitle the government to take the
property of an individual only if compensation is paid. 28 The
limitation on government's expropriation power protects property
rights which the courts view as an important guarantee of individual
liberty.
29
24. On this point, consider the recent decision of the Ontario Labour Relations
Board in United Steelworkers of America v. The Adams Mine, Cliffs of Canada
Ltd., Manager (1982), 83 C.L.L.C. 16,011, which held that a union was
prohibited from campaigning for a political party on the job site. While the decision
was made in the context of whether or not political campaigning was a legitimate
union activity, the analysis is forced into that framework by the initial premise that
an employer has the right, because of property ownership, to control activities on
the site. The Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 228, ss. 3, 11, 64, 66, 70, and
71 modify this only to the extent that protection is given to lawful activities of a
trade union.
25. See Ackerman, supra, note 10; Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensation" Law (1968), 80
Harv. L. Rev. 100; Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights (1971), 81
Yale L.J. 149; Quinn, Trebilcock, Compensation, Transition Costs, and
Regulatory Change (1982), 32 U.T.L.J. 117.
26. Tullock, "Achieving Regulation - A public choice perspective," [1978]
Regulation. While these criteria were initially suggested in the context of
compensating those injured by regulatory change, they are also useful in the
context of the more particular problem of property taking.
27. For example, Expropriation Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 148.
28. Attorney General v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel Ltd., [1920] A.C. 508, 542
(H.L.).
29. Belfast Corporation v. O.D. Cars Ltd., [1960] A.C. 490, 523, (H.L.).
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This court attitude has important ramifications when one
considers the extent to which regulation and creation of government
monopolies might effectively cut off a person from his or her
livelihood. In Manitoba Fisheries v. The Queen, 30 the Supreme
Court of Canada considered a situation where the federal
government set up a crown corporation with exclusive rights to
export freshwater fish from Canada. This legislation caused the
plaintiff, a corporation, to be totally deprived of its business. In
requiring the government to compensate the plaintiff, the court
characterized the goodwill of a business as being, while intangible
in character, as much a part of the property of the business as the
premises, machinery, and equipment used in production. The
difficulty with the decision was the finding that the obliteration of
the goodwill amounted to a taking of property by the government.
While it was true that customers of the plaintiff would have to now
deal with the crown corporation, it was not because the goodwill
was transferred, but because the customers had no choice but to deal
with the monopoly.
It is clear that the Crown can expropriate property without
compensation, provided the empowering statute clearly states so.
3 1
But not every interference with property rights is a taking. 3 2 There
30. (1978), 88 D.L.R. (3d) 462. The case is commented upon by Bucknall,
Developments in Property Law: the 1978-79 and 1979-80 Terms (1981), 2 Sup. Ct.
L.R. 279.
31. See, for example, The National Library Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. N-11, s.ll,
which provides that a publisher of a book shall, at his own expense, send two
copies of the book to the National Librarian. See also The Queen v. Appleby et al
(1980), 114 D.L.R. (3d) 341 (Fed. Ct., T.D.).
32. Hence, in La Ferme Filibier Lte v. The Queen, [ 1980] F.C. 128 (T.D.), when
a person who had operated a fish hatchery for a number of years was prohibited
from doing so any longer because of a change in regulations, he was unable to
maintain an action for compensation. This raises fundamental questions about the
extent to which the government should be able to deny entitlements it has granted
which form an essential part of the economic well-being of a person. See Reich,
The New Property (1964) 73 Yale L.J. 733. Administrative discretion to deny or
revoke entitlements must be exercised in accordance with the purpose and object of
the statutes. The revocation may not be used as a means of restricting a citizen's
exercise of rights or privileges unrelated to the statute creating the entitlement. See
Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R. 129. Does it make a difference whether the
entitlement is taken away pursuant to a regulation, rather than merely by
administrative action? Persons who are granted licences by statutory tribunal have
the natural justice right to a hearing before the licence is annulled, or at least to
some form of procedural justice. See J. Evans, ed., deSmith's Judicial Review of
Administrative Action 222 (4th ed., 1980).
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is a wide range of government activities which have an impact on
one's property or on the extent to which one can obtain revenue
from property. Rental controls, export restrictions, communications
policies, environmental control, land-use planning, and health and
safety regulation will all in some way limit the full use and
enjoyment of property by individuals. Nevertheless, to require
compensation for every such decrease in the revenue potential of
property would stifle the full potential of government to redistribute
wealth in such a way as to equalize the opportunities of the least
well-off groups in society.
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 33 does not
specifically include property rights in the class of fundamental
rights meriting protection. There is still much lobbying taking place
to have the Charter amended to include property rights. 34 Section 26
of the Charter provides that the guarantees included in it shall not be
construed so as to deny the existence of any other freedoms that
exist in Canada, thus leaving courts with room to continue their
deference to property rights. 35
33. Canada Act, 1982; c. 11 (U.K.) Part I: Constitution Act 1982, Schedule B.
34. In the Canadian Bill of Rights, R.S.C. 1970, App. Ill, s. 1, the right of the
individual to enjoyment of property and the right not to be deprived thereof except
by due process of law is expressly affirmed. Whether such a guarantee should be
included in a Charter has been the subject of varying views. For example, the
Victoria Charter of 1971 did not include a right to property. The Special Joint
Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons on the Constitution of
Canada, Final Report (1972), recommended that the "right of the individual
person to the enjoyment of property and the right not to be deprived thereof except
in accordance with the public good and for just compensation" be recognized. The
Canadian Bar Association Committee on the Constitution, Towards a New
Canada, urged recognition of the right to enjoy property and not to be deprived of it
except according to law. During the debates in the Special Joint Committee of the
Senate and House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada, Minutes of the
Proceedings and Evidence, 44:12, (23 Jan. 1981), inclusion of property rights in
section 7 was recommended and came very close to being accepted. Much of the
objection came from the provinces which were concerned about its possible effect
on zoning, environmental, and industrial development legislation. Another concern
was whether only individuals, or corporations as well, would be entitled to such
protection.
35. One decision which came immediately after the Charter was proclaimed
suggests that the "right to .... security of the person" in s. 7 extends to the right
of enjoyment of property, and that s. 26 preserves the right to enjoyment of
property free from the threat of confiscation without compensation. See Melvin v.
The Queen in Right of New Brunswick (1982), 1 C.R.R. 307 (N.B.Q.B.).
Property in the Welfare State 353
There are several dangers in creating a specific form of property
rights in the Charter. First, if compensation is required whenever a
person is deprived of a property right, it would have to be made
clear that the power of the government to tax or use forfeiture as a
penalty is exempt. Second, if only due process protection is
extended, as in the Canadian Bill of Rights, there is the danger that
the courts could build a substantive doctrine to knock down
regulatory and social welfare schemes, as occurred in the United
States in such famous cases as Lochner v. New York, 3 6 Adair v. The
United States,3 7 and Coppage v. Kansas.3 8 The more desirable
form of protection would be to prohibit interference with the
employment of property, except in accordance with law.3 9 This
would then leave the protection of such rights to the political
process. Finally, it is worth noting the changing nature of property.
When Locke was claiming that one of the ends of the state was to
protect property, land was still the chief object of property and the
most effective means of guaranteeing the realization of human
potential was to provide rights with respect to the use and benefit of
land. 40 However, with the coming of the Industrial Revolution,
great numbers of individuals could no longer claim a subsistence
from the cultivation of land and so the sale of one's labour became
the main source of revenue for the individual. The inequality of
bargaining power between the labourer and the owner of capital
ensured that the labourer would not be able to develop any form of
security with respect to access to work. 4 1 The law which had
developed the concept of property as a claim of an individual which
was enforceable and backed by the coercive power of the state has
36. (1905), 198 U.S. 45.
37. (1908), 208 U.S. 161.
38. (1915), 236 U.S. 1.
39. Tarnopolsky, A Bill of Rights and Future Constitutional Change (1979), 57
Can. Bar Rev. 626.
40. MacPherson, "Liberal-Democracy and Property", in C.B. MacPherson, ed.,
Property: Mainstream and Critical Positions 199 (1978).
41. There existed two useful methods of control to reduce the bargaining power of
labour. One set of measures served to keep unemployment high, thus reducing the
bargaining position of those who did have work because their positions were
continually in jeopardy from those who did not have work. Second, by
restructuring the availability of public relief to the unemployed, they would be
forced to accept whatever position was offered, no matter how demeaning or
unacceptable the terms and conditions. See F. Fox and R. Cloward, The New Class
War 55 (1982).
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been slow in responding both to the dangers of permitting mass
accumulations of property in a limited number of persons and to the
demands to be secure in the means of a livelihood.
At present, the individual relies not only on his or her own labour
as a source of sufficient revenue to provide for needs and wants, but
also looks to the state as a source. Through a variety of social
security and welfare mechanisms, the individual has come to rely on
the state for support. In addition, the extensive forms of government
regulation mean that a person must acquire government approval
through licensing, contracts, and franchises in order to carry on
many activities that provide a livelihood. These forms of "new
property" 42 are as deserving of protection as are our traditional
forms of property.
The best way to approach the problem of defining what forms of
property are deserving of protection is to realize that it is not only
the rights of persons to exclude others from the use or benefit of a
thing which should be protected. Equally, there should be a right
not to be excluded by others from the use or benefit of some
things. 4 3 The things from which persons should not be excluded are
those achievements of society as a whole which provide individuals
with an equal opportunity to develop their human capacities. This
would then include an equal right of access to work and a right to an
income from the whole produce of society, an income not
necessarily related to work, but to what is needed for a fully human
life. 44
In developing ways to protect rights to accommodation and work,
the law is fundamentally changing the degree of respect accorded to
traditional forms of property rights. There is a growing recognition
that individuals have a right not to be arbitrarily deprived of certain
vital scarce resources to which they have gained access. Thus, the
state, through its creation of income maintenance programs, health
and education benefits, and welfare and other forms of wealth
transfers, is modifying our concept of entitlements. The law is used
to create and guarantee rights to these services and payments with
corresponding duties on the officials who administer the
programs. 4 5 The remainder of this paper will look at two particular
42. Reich, The New Property (1964), 73 Yale L.J. 733.
43. MacPherson, supra, note 40 at p. 201.
44. Ibid, at p. 206.
45. Raz, "On the Functions of Law", in Simpson, ed. Oxford Essays in
Jurisprudence 278, 293-4 (Second Series, 1973). See also Hindle, Information and
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areas in which the problems of security of access to vital needs is
receiving considerable attention by both courts and legislatures.
II. Protection for the Residential Tenant
The landlord-tenant relationship is one where there is an enormous
possibility for conflict between individuals with respect to control
over an element necessary to the security of an individual -
housing. The landlord, who is thought of by the ordinary person as
the owner of the property, claims rights to deal with dwellings so as
to protect his or her interests. Those interests include preventing
deterioration, insuring a return on investment, and controlling the
use of the premises as he or she thinks best. The tenant, on the other
hand, has a need that is as compelling as that of the landlord - to
have safe and healthy accommodations at a price that does not force
the tenant to forgo a fair share of other necessities. The manner in
which the law is regulating this relationship is indicative of the
increasing emphasis on protecting the individual's right to enjoy
security in the necessities of life.
The legal rules regulating the landlord-tenant relationship in
Canada were founded upon English common law conceptions of
rights in land. Although the relationship is normally created by
contract, either express or implied, many of the incidents attaching
to it are structurally dependant on notions of estates in land and
nonfreehold tenure. In the terms of conventional property law, a
leasehold estate always involved two proprietary interests - the
current possessory estate of the tenant and the reversion of the
landlord. 46 However, the interests of the landlord tended to
predominate over those of the tenant. Many of the incidents
associated with the relationship reflected the feudal structure out of
which the modem doctrines grew, structures no longer suitable to
either the commercial realities or the social and economic aspects of
urban living. 47 Some of the doctrines which have given the landlord
the "Right" to Income Maintenance [1981] N.Z.L.J. 445; Michelman, The
Supreme Court, 1968 Term - Foreward: On Protecting the Poor Through the
Fourteenth Amendment (1969), 83 Harv. L. Rev. 7; Tribe, Unraveling National
League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential
Government Services (1977), 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1065.
46. Glendon, The Transformation of Amercan Landlord-Tenant Law (1982), 23
B.C.L.R. 503, 522.
47. See Ontario Law Reform Commission, Interim Report on Landlord and
Tenant Law Applicable to Residential Tenancies 10 (1968). The extent to which
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an enormous advantage in the tenancy relationship included the
self-help remedy of distress, the principle that the covenants in a
lease were to be considered to be independent so that a tenant would
be forced to continue paying rent despite breaches by the landlord of
covenants to repair, and the application of a principle of caveat
lessee whereby, unless the lease specified otherwise, the landlord
was not required to provide residential premises which were
habitable. Whether these rules developed because the lease was
seen primarily as a conveyance of an interest in land or because the
contract in the lease reflected the special claims of the landlord for
the protection of his or her interests, 48 it is clear that the tenant had
very little protection through the legal system. For the large segment
of the citizenry who had but little choice to live in rental
accommodation, this imbalance could have created a sense of
injustice.
Recent developments indicate considerable change in the way in
which the legal system perceives the landlord-tenant relationship.
There is a growing dichotomy in the treatment of commercial and
residential tenancies. The courts are bringing the commercial
tenancy increasingly more in line with contractual principles. Only
twenty years ago, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that if a lease
was terminated, the covenants contained therein came to an end, so
that no claim could be made for prospective contractual damages.
4 9
The Supreme Court of Canada overturned this decision in 1971 in
Highway Properties Limited v. Kelly, Douglas & Company
Limited, 50 stating that, with respect to commercial leases, it was no
longer sensible to pretend that it is simply a conveyance and not also
a contract. The Supreme Court has since reiterated this view by
urban Canadians rely on rental premises for their housing needs can be seen from
the percentages of occupied private dwellings which are rental units in a selection
of cities: Halifax, 44.4%; Ottawa-Hull, 47.7%; Toronto, 43.5%; Regina, 35.7%;
Vancouver, 41.5%. Statistics Canada, 1981 Census of Canada: Census Tracts,
Population, Occupied Private Dwellings, Private Households, Census Families in
Private Households: Selected Characteristics.
48. See Siegal, Is a Modern Lease a Contract or a Conveyance - A Historical
Inquiry (1975), 52 J. Urb. L. 649 and Weinberg, From Contract to Conveyance:
The Law of Landlord and Tenant, 1800-1920 (Part 1), [1980] So. 111. U.L.J. 29.
49. Goldhar v. Universal Sections and Mouldings Ltd. (1962), 36 D.L.R. (2d)
450.
50. (1971), 17D.L.R. (3d) 710, 721.
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stating that the doctrine of mitigation is applicable to the breach of a
commercial lease. 5 1
One long-standing rule which separated leases from other types
of contracts was the refusal to apply, to leases, the doctrine of
frustration. From the time when Prince Rupert expelled the tenant
Jane from his lands until very recently, the courts refused to give
relief to a tenant who was unable to use the rented premises because
of what would normally be considered a frustrating event. 52 The
refusal was based on the property origins of the lease: since the lease
created an estate in land, the lessee still had the benefit of the estate,
if not the beneficial use of the land, despite the otherwise frustrating
event. 53 Recently, the House of Lords has held that the doctrine of
frustration was capable of applying to an executed lease of land if a
frustrating event occurred during the currency of the term.
5 4
Emphasis was placed on the incongruity in distinguishing between
personal property and real property. The length of the lease and the
permanence of land are considerations to be accounted for in
determining how the risk of frustrating events should be
apportioned. It is not sensible to say that the tenant has the benefit of
the leasehold estate when all the tenant really wants is the use of the
premises for a particular purpose. The conferring of an estate is not
an end in itself, but merely a subsidiary means of obtaining an object.
While the courts' recent emphasis on the lease as a contract may
be a substantial improvement in the law for commercial
arrangements where the parties are likely to be relatively equal in
bargaining power, this does little to improve the position of
residential tenants. In many situations, especially if there is a
shortage of rental accommodations, the tenant will be at a relative
5I. Apeco of Canada Ltd. v. Windmill Place (1978), 82 D.L.R. (3d) 1.
52. Paradine v. Jane (1647), Aleyn 26, 82 E.R. 897 (K.B.).
53. Cricklewood Property and Trust Investment Ltd. v. Leightons Investment Trust
Ltd., [1945] A.C. 221: [1945] 1 All E.R. 252 (H.L.). There were some suggestions
that, given this rationale for refusing to apply the frustration doctrine, the doctrine
could apply where rental premises above ground level in an apartment or office
building were destroyed. See Rhodes, ed., Williams' Canadian Law of Landlord
and Tenant 6 (4th ed., 1973).
54. National Carriers Ltd. v. Panalpina (Northern) Ltd., [1981] 1 All E.R. 161.
The decision was presaged by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Capital Quality
Homes Ltd. v. Colwyn Construction Ltd. (1975), 90.R (2d) 617, 61 D.L.R. (3d)
385, which had observed that the doctrine should apply to leasehold interests. See
also Robertson, Frustrated leases: ''No to Never - But Rarely if Ever" (1982),
60 Can. Bar Rev. 619.
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disadvantage in attempting to strike a bargain. Furthermore,
through the use of standard form leases, the landlord will be able to
impose a "take-it-or-leave-it" package of rights and obligations.
By narrowly defining his or her obligations and with the extensive
use of exemption clauses, the landlord can insulate himself or
herself from onerous burdens and effectively block the tenant's
aspirations to be secure in the tenancy. It is doubtful whether the
law of contract is sufficiently flexible to adequately regulate the
landlord-tenant relationship, even with rules regarding
unconscionability, 55 given an inequality of bargaining power and an
increasing sophistication in dealing with standard form contracts.
The parties have basic interests which must be protected, and
legislatures increasingly recognize that there is wide scope for
remedial legislation to protect the security of tenants. 5
6
All Canadian provinces have enacted specialized legislation
governing residential tenancies 5 7 which extensively revises com-
mon law doctrine. For instance, it abolishes the landlord's right to
avail himself or herself of the self-help remedy of distress for
nonpayment of rent. 58 The doctrine of frustration now clearly
applies in most jurisdictions to residential leases. 59 Nor will a tenant
be required to continue paying rent or to perform other obligations
under the lease, given the breach of a material covenant by the
landlord. 60 Furthermore, the landlord may not unreasonably or
55. For instance, in the state of New York, tenants have been given the right to
petition a court to declare that a lease or any of its clauses are unconscionable and,
hence, unenforceable; see N.Y. Real Property Law 235-C (McKinney Supp.
1978). For a consideration of the applicability of the doctrine of unconscionability
to leases, see Farrelly, Leasehold Unconscionability: Caveat Lessor (1978-79), 7
Ford. Urb. L. J. 337.
56. Even where a statute sets out the rights and obligations of the parties, the
extent to which the parties may contract about additional terms has been subjected
in one jurisdiction to tests of reasonableness. See Residential Tenancy Act,
R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 365, s. 10.
57. Landlord and Tenant Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. L-6; Residential Tenancies Act,
R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 365; Landlord and Tenant Act, R.S.M. 1970, c. L70; The
Residential Tenancies Act, R.S.N.B. 1973; c. R-10.2; The Landlord and Tenant
(Residential Tenancies) Act, 1973, S.N. 1973, No. 54; Residential Tenancies Act,
S.N.S. 1970, c. 13; Landlord and Tenant Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 232, Part IV;
Landlord and Tenant Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1974, c. L-7, Part V; Quebec Civil Code,
Articles 1650-1665.6; The Residential Tenancies Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. R-22.
58. B.C., ss. 8(1); 8(1.1); Ont., s.86; N.S., ss.4, 4A.
59. B.C., s. 8(3); Ont., s. 88; N.S., no provision.
60. B.C., s. 9: Ont. s. 89; N.S., no provision.
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arbitrarily withhold consent to the assignment or subletting by a
tenant. 61 Restrictions are placed on the landlord's rights to require
security deposits 62 and a positive duty is placed on the landlord to
provide and maintain the premises in a good state of repair and a
state fit for habitation during the tenancy. 63 Accompanying these
significant changes are a variety of remedial procedures which make
use of more expeditious and informal techniques to adjudicate
disputes. 64 The attempt of provinces to completely remove from the
courts jurisdiction over all aspects of residential tenancy matters by
creating residential tenancy commissions which would be solely
responsible for enforcing the statutory schemes has run afoul of
section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867.65 Nevertheless, there is a
clear trend towards using extensive government regulation,
accompanied by administrative enforcement mechanisms, in an
attempt to protect and balance the vital interests of both the landlord
and the tenant,
By far the most significant modification to the subsisting
distribution of property rights between the landlord and the tenant
occurs through the implementation of rental controls and security of
tenure schemes. The relationship between the two is of a symbiotic
nature. The rental controls prevent the landlord from capturing all
61. Ont., s. 91: B.C., s. 29: N.S., s. 6(l).
62. Ont., s. 84: B.C., s. 31; N.S., s. 9.
63. Ont., s. 96: B.C., s. 25: N.S., s. 6(1).
64. For instance, the tenant may be entitled to withhold rent and obtain an order for
abatement of rent when the landlord breaches covenants or statutory duties.
Although the present Ontario Act still provides for enforcement primarily through
the county court, in British Columbia wide powers are given to a rentalsman to
make orders binding on the parties. In Nova Scotia, the Residential Tenancies
Commission has powers to hold a hearing and make a report to the county court,
which can then grant the order sought by the landlord or tenant.
65. Formerly the British North America Act, 1867, 30-31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.). In
enacting the Residential Tenancies Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 452, only portions of
which have yet been proclaimed, the Ontario legislature created a Residential
Tenancies Commission which would be responsible for making orders for
possession or orders to comply with obligations imposed by the act. While the
Supreme Court of Canada felt that there may be a need for procedures which are not
too cumbersome, formal, or expensive, the duties being farmed out to the
commission were judicial powers within the purview of section 96; see Reference
Re Residential Tenancies Act (1981), 123 D.L.R. (3d) 554. The Supreme Court
refused to comment on the British Columbia legislation which had been held to be
intra vires by the B.C. Court of Appeal in Re Pepita and Doukas (1980), 101
D.L.R. (3d) 577.
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the windfall profits generated by the scarcity of housing resources,
while at the same time preventing social and economic hardships,
which would otherwise ensue, from befalling those seeking
accommodations. 66 Security of tenure, on the other hand, is a
means of ensuring that a tenant who has secured rental
accommodation cannot be deprived thereof unless there is good
cause for doing so. It is a natural concomitant of rental control, and
prevents the landlord from using threats of eviction to coerce a
tenant to agree to pay a rent that exceeds the statutory limit.
Although the rental rate under a rent control scheme is normally tied
to the premises and not to the individual lease, where the housing
market is restricted, the landlord's bargaining power is such that he
may be able to extract illegal rents unless the tenant is assured of
security.
Just as security of tenure is a means of protecting the integrity of a
rent control program, rent controls serve to ensure that there is
security in the tenant's occupation of residential premises. If the
primary objective is to protect the tenant's right to occupancy of the
premises, there must be some means of ensuring that the landlord is
unable to use threats of unjustified rental increases to force a tenant
to forfeit possession. A general system of rent controls is one means
of so doing.
In Ontario, rental controls and the scheme of security of tenure
were introduced concurrently in 1975.67 Before the introduction of
a system of security of tenure, the landlord had the right to terminate
a tenancy agreement at the end of its term, whether the tenancy
agreement specified a fixed termination date or created a periodic
tenancy. While there may have been requirements that sufficient
notice be given to the tenant, 68 there was no restriction upon the
reasons on which a landlord might base his decision to end the
tenancy - in fact, there was no requirement that a landlord give any
reasons at all for so doing. At present, however, a landlord in
Ontario is only entitled to obtain possession, after giving the
required notice, if the tenant voluntarily vacates the premises or if
66. Rent Control in New York City 1 (1967) quoted in Interim Report on Landlord
and Tenant Law, supra, note 47.
67. An Act to Amend the Landlord and Tenant Act, S.O. 1975 (Second Sess.), c.
13; The Residential Premises Rent Review Act, 1975, S.O. 1975 (Second Sess.) c.
12.
68. In Ontario, notice requirements are set out in ss. 100-105 of the Landlord and
Tenant Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 232.
Property in the Welfare State 361
the landlord obtains an order from the county court for possession.
The landlord has no right to any self-help remedy. To be entitled to
obtain a court order, landlords must demonstrate that they have
cause, and the reasons giving cause are limited to those set out in the
statute. Such causes include nonpayment of rent by the tenant,
misconduct by the tenant with respect to the use of the premises, or
the landlord requiring the premises for other specified uses. If the
landlords cannot demonstrate a reason why he or she should obtain
possession and if no new tenancy agreement is entered into by the
parties, the landlord and tenant are deemed to have renewed the
tenancy as a monthly tenancy and upon the same terms and
conditions as in the expired agreement. This is a statutory form of
tenancy.
There has been a fundamental alteration in the extent to which the
landlord can claim a reversionary interest in rental premises.
According to one commentator, if the legislature successfully
identifies the forms of obnoxious tenant conduct and the legitimate
needs of the landlord for which the tenancy should be terminable,
all the landlord will have lost is the right to be capricious or arbitrary
in ending the tenancy. 69 However, this represents a change in
emphasis on the contents of the property rights distributed between
the landlord and the tenant. The public interest in ensuring the
security of the individual with respect to the vital need of housing
deprives landlords of a right they had previously enjoyed - the
right to obtain possession of premises for any purpose, whether or
not the purpose was considered by the legislature to be reasonable.
Under the Ontario scheme, when a landlord applies for a writ of
possession, the judge is given the discretion to refuse to grant the
writ unless he is satisfied that it would be unfair to do so, and he
may, in any event, order the postponement of the enforcement of a
writ of possession for up to one week. 70 If a tenant in economic
straits is having difficulty paying rent, but the housing shortage is so
severe that a writ of possession may literally leave him with no
place to go, a judge will be sorely tempted to allow the tenant to
remain for one week. This leaves the landlord with the expense of
supporting the tenant, a most direct form of wealth redistribution. It
raises troubling questions about techniques used by government to
69. Gorsky, An Examination of Some of the Recent Amendments to the Ontario
Landlord and Tenant Act (1977), 3 Dal. L.J. 663, 669.
70. Landlord and Tenant Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 261, s. 121.
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protect vital interests. Although there may be a general need to
distribute more wealth to tenants as a class, the danger lies in
putting an unequal burden on certain landlords. A more
comprehensive scheme of government-directed wealth distribution,
exercised through a general welfare system or through public
housing, would be preferable. In the absence of such a program,
such discretionary powers may be justifiable as a short-term,
second-best mechanism, on the basis of the weight of the vital
interests of the tenant in comparison with those of the landlord.
It is not only the security of tenure provisions which raise
questions about the changing nature of the tenancy relationship and
the redistribution of wealth. Rent control is perhaps a more visable
manifestation of these issues. Although rental controls were used in
Canada during World War II, they did not continue to be in wide
use. When the Anti-Inflation Program was introduced in 1975, most
provinces enacted rent control schemes. In a number of provinces,
these have outlasted, by far, most of the other elements of the
program. Although rental controls are one means of providing
greater effectiveness to a security of tenure regime, they are not a
necessary element. 7 ' So long as a mechanism is set up to ensure that
a rent increase is not imposed for the purpose of forcing the tenant to
vacate the premises, security of tenancy would be operable. In a
number of states in the United States, prohibitions on retaliatory
eviction have been the primary protection afforded to tenants, and
only in a few states is there a wider form of security of tenure.
72
Nevertheless, even a system which guarantees only freedom from
retaliatory eviction can be very effective. If retaliatory eviction is
easily assumed and if the assumption is difficult to rebut, the
difference between retaliatory eviction and "good cause" eviction
diminishes. Similarly, if rental control is eschewed as a means of
making security of tenure more concrete, a presumption that rent
increases are intended to be retaliatory will nevertheless provide
extensive protection.
A system of rental controls will prevent the unwarranted
distribution of income from tenants to landlords. However, the
71. See, for example, British Columbia Law Reform Commission, Landlord and
Tenant Relationships: Residential Tenancies (1973) and Institute of Law Research
and Reform, Report No. 22: Residential Tenancies 135 (1975, Allurta), both of
which recommend that if security of tenure provisions are to be introduced, this
should be done without rent controls.
72. Glendon. supra, note I at p. 523.
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strictures placed on landlords may lead to a number of almost
inevitable consequences. First, there is a major disincentive to the
construction of new rental accommodations. This, in turn, leads to
the growing intervention of government in supplying rental
accommodation. 73 In addition, the need to maintain existing rental
stock may make it necessary to restrict the landlord's right to
convert premises to other uses, in particular, condominiums. In
Ontario, such restrictions have been effectively imposed by indirect
means. A conversion of rental premises to condominiums requires a
subdivision of the site, 74 for which the approval of the Minister of
Housing is needed. In accordance with the Planning Act, 75 the
minister may confer with officials of municipalities to ensure that
the subdivision meets all requirements or the authority to approve
the application may be delegated to a municipal council. A number
of municipal councils have promulgated policy statements specify-
ing that permission to convert rental accommodations into con-
dominiums will not be granted unless the vacancy rate exceeds a
specified percentage. 7 6 The Ontario Municipal Board has approved
the practice, stating that the municipality is justified in attempting to
ensure that rent control is not circumvented by such conversions.
77
These instances of government intervention seriously undermine
traditional concepts of private ownership of property. The landlord
is forced to accept a fixed rate of return on his or her investment
because of rental control. Once some persons have been accepted as
tenants, regulation of the relationship and its termination is beyond
the control of the landlord, except for a few enumerated exceptions.
And finally, with the restrictions on conversion to condominiums,
the landlord is forced to maintain the property as rental
accommodation. As one commentator has put it, the landlord
merely exercises administrative and managerial responsibility,
73. For example, the Canada Rental Supply Program, administered by the Canada
Mortgage and Housing Corporation, provides incentives for the construction of
rental accommodation. In 1982-83, funds have been budgeted for the construction
of 30,000 rental units. Interest-free loans for fifteen years of $7,500 per unit are
available. Calls are made for proposals in cities that have low vacancy rates, with
that being the primary criterion for allocating funds across the country.
74. Condominium Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 84, ss. 2, 4, 50.
75. R.S.O. 1980, c. 379, ss. 36(3), 53(2).
76. For example, the stipulated percentage for the City of Ottawa is 3%.
77. See Abraham Saslove Ltd. v. City of Ottawa (1980), I1 O.M.B.R. 86;
Quantock Investments Ltd. v. City of Toronto (1980), 11 O.M.B.R. 234; Re
Borough of Etobicoke Official Plan Amendment No. 5-7 (1980), 11 O.M.B.R. 311.
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while ownership has, in effect, been transferred to the public
sector. 78 Another characterization of the landlord-tenant relation-
ship is that it has become dominated by status. Although the parties
are free to enter the relationship, once it is created its incidents are
fixed by law. The basis of the typical statutory arrangement is no
longer contractual, and the law of landlord and tenant relationships
has shifted from the domain of private law to that of public law,
with the goal of protecting the vital interests of the parties and the
public under modern urban conditions which require the proper
operation and maintenance of housing. 79 In fact, the landlord-tenant
relationship has become subject to much the same style of
regulation as public utilities. The rates set by public utilities are
usually subject to review by an administrative board, created by
statute. 80 For reasons of efficiency, the public utility is likely to
have a monopoly in the supply of services, and the rates it may
charge are, therefore, regulated to protect the consumer while
allowing the utility a reasonable return on investment. Here the
analogy to the landlord-tenant relationship breaks down, in that the
supply of rental housing is not likely to be monopolistic.
81
Nevertheless, a similarity remains in that there is still the danger of
the landlord being able to extort exorbitant rents because of
fluctuating demand in the housing market.
Further comparisons between the landlord and the public utility
are worth considering. One duty that is placed on the public utility is
the obligation to provide services. For those public utilities
regulated by the Ontario Public Utilities Act, 82 a corporation is
required to supply services, upon request, to all buildings along the
line of any supply pipe, wire, or rod, provided that there is a
sufficient supply of the utility. It is probable that a similar duty
78. G. Klippert, Residential Tenancies in British Columbia 158 (1976).
79. Glendon, supra, note 46 at p. 553.
80. The following provisions regulate the rates charged for public utilities in
Ontario: Ontario Energy Board Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 382, s. 19 (gas); s. 37
(electricity); Power Corporation Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 384, ss. 90, 92, 95
(electricity); Railway Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. R-2, s. 320 (telephones and telegraphs).
81. Berger, The New Residential Tenancy Law -Are Landlords Public Utilities?
(1981), 60 Neb. L. Rev. 707.
82. R.S.O. 1980, c. 423. Utilities covered include water, artificial or natural gas,
electrical power or energy, and steam or hot water. A similar provision exists for
telephone services provided by Bell Canada: An Act Respecting the Bell Telephone
Company of Canada, S.C. 1902, c. 41, s. 2.
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existed at common law. 83 Thus, the utility has no discretion in
deciding whether to grant the service. The only parallel restriction
placed on landlords in making their decisions to rent premises to
particular individuals are the provisions of the Human Rights Code
which prohibit the landlord from discriminating on the grounds
specified. 84
Another aspect worth comparing is the right to ask for security
deposits. The landlord is normally restricted in the amount of the
deposit which can be requested of a residential tenant.8 5 Similarly,
it has been held that a public utility may not require a consumer to
pay a deposit before connecting services unless there is express
power given to the utility company to do so. 86 The particular danger
is that there may be discrimination against those who have not yet
established a credit rating. Generally, the power to ask for security
deposits is granted to the utility,8 7 although there may be strict
scrutiny of the system used.
8 8
A more interesting analogy arises between the termination of a
tenancy and the termination of utility services. For those services
regulated by the Ontario Public Utilities Act, it seems that once
supply of a utility has commenced, it can be terminated without the
consumer's consent only if the consumer has failed to continue
paying the rate. 8 9 Thus, the utility company, so long as it continues
to supply services in the area, cannot refuse to continue supplying a
particular customer unless there is cause - and the only permitted
cause, nonpayment of rates, is analogous to the nonpayment of rent
by a tenant. 90 Nevertheless, the process by which a utility company
83. St. Lawrence Rendering Company Ltd. v. The City of Cornwall, [1951] O.R.
669; Chastain v. B.C. Hydro & Power Authority (1972), 32 D.L.R. (3d) 443
(B.C.S.C.); A.G. Canada v. The City ofToronto (1893), 23 S.C.R. 514; Scottish
Ontario and Manitoba Land Co. v. City of Toronto (1899), 26 O.A.R. 345; The
City of Hamilton v. The Hamilton Distillery Co. (1907), 38 S.C.R. 239; c.f.
Holmberg et al v. Public Utilities Commission of Sault Ste. Marie, [1966] 2 O.R.
675 (C.A.).
84. S.O. 1981, c. 53, s. 2.
85. Landlord and Tenant Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 232, ss. 84, 85.
86. Chastain v. B.C. Hydro, supra, note 83.
87. Public Utilities Act, R.S.O. 1980, c.423, s. 49(4).
88. The CRTC, for instance, closely regulates the policies of Bell Canada; see
CRTC Telecom Public Notice 1982-83: Bell Canada - Trial of New Credit
Screening Process.
89. R.S.O. 1980, c. 423, s. 58; St. Lawrence Rendering Co., supra, note 83.
90. One particular problem may arise for a tenant where the landlord has assumed
the duty of paying for utilities. If the landlord is in arrears, can the utility company
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may terminate a service when payment has not been forthcoming
illustrates gaps in the protection of vital interests. The continuation
of the service is of great concern to the consumer. To be suddenly
denied the service with no advance warning and no opportunity to
make one's case that the service should not be disconnected may
create a serious hardship and, if the company acted wrongfully,
should arguably be cause for redress.
This point is becoming well-developed in the constitutional
jurisprudence of the United States. To the extent that a public utility
can be said to be acting as an organ of the state, 91 it may be required
by the due process provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to
provide a hearing before disconnecting services. 92 The right to a
service is a property right. This is so because it is possible to
characterize the interest in continued supply of utility services as an
entitlement created by state law through the recognition that a
consumer has a right to damages if utility services are disconnected
without cause. No person may then be denied enjoyment of the
property right, except when certain procedural devices are
followed.
9 3
In Canada, there seems to have been little thought given to the
matter. Public utilities which are expressly mandated by statute to
require the tenant to pay the arrears as a condition of continuing the supply? It has
been held that where a mortgagor is in arrears on rates and a mortgagee takes
possession, the mortgagee is entitled to an injunction to prevent disconnection of
services, and there is no duty on the mortgagee to pay the debts of the mortgagor;
Syncap Credit Corp. v. Consumers' Gas Co. and Scarborough Public Utilities
Commission (1978), 18 O.R. (2d) 633. The wording of section 54 of the Public
Utilities Act suggests that the occupant, as well as the owner, has a right to demand
supply of the services. Several recent cases holding a receiver liable to pay
debts of the debtor as a condition of continued service have clearly rested on the
ground that the receiver is occupying the premises as an agent of the debtor; Pete
Marivick Ltd. v. Consumers' Gas Co. (1977), 18 O.R. (2d) 631 aff'd (1980), 29
O.R. (2d) 336 (C.A.); Roy Nat Ltd. v. Consumers' Gas Co. (1980), 28 O.R. (2d)
97; c.f. Canada Trust et al v. Consumers' Gas Co. (1977), 18 O.R. (2d) 629; Re
Les Plastiques Valsen Inc.: Gaz Metropolitain Ltd. v. St. Georges (1981), 41
C.B.R. (N.S.) 7 (C.S. Qu6.).
91. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. (1974), 419 U.S. 345.
92. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft (1978), 436 U.S. 1.
93. See Case Comment, (1979), 12 Creighton L. Rev. 1243; Case Comment
(1976), 14 Duquesne L. Rev. 761; Comment, Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
in Termination of Utility Services for Nonpayment (1973), 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1477;
Note, Constitutional Protection of Summary Telephone Disconnections for Illegal
Use (1982), 82 Colum. L.R. 98.
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disconnect services of a person who has not paid the rates may be
required to act fairly by informing the consumer of the reasons for
disconnection and by giving him or her an opportunity to be heard.
The Canadian Radio and Television Commission has recently
suggested that there may be a need to review the policies of the
telephone companies under its jurisdiction in order to ensure that a
pre-termination hearing of some kind is held. 9 4 The limited
recognition given to the vital interest of the consumer in continuing
the supply of essential services is in contrast to the more extensive
protection given a tenant. The mechanism used in Ontario for the
review of a tenant's claim to continue in the premises is to require
the landlord to obtain a court order before evicting. Thus, the tenant
is given an opportunity to a court hearing, a much more formal
procedure than might be required of a public utility if there was
merely a duty to act fairly before terminating services.
The similarities in the regulation of the residential tenancy and
the public utility should not be overstated. Nevertheless, it makes
sense to prevent arbitrary conduct of both the landlord and the
public utility by specifying the causes for which the tenancy or
supply of services should end and to provide procedural protection
to ensure that the rights of the tenant or consumer are not trampled.
The implementation of such rights modifies the extent to which
the landlord or utility company can exercise its power over its own
property. Stating that the tenant or consumer has acquired a new
form of property obfuscates a more crucial issue: how does one
guarantee security in housing and the essential services connected
therewith for those who are unable to pay? An intermittent duty on
the landlord and public utility company to continue supplying the
essential needs of the indigent is not a proper solution. The
underlying structure of the welfare state will still have to redistribute
wealth to those who cannot provide for their own needs. The need
for the protection of those who have not acquired the "new
property" or cannot afford to pay for it is as great as it is for those
who can pay their way.
94. Telecom Decision CRTC 77-14. At present, the Bell Canada General Tariff,
Rule 35, specifies the grounds on which the company can terminate services. There
is no requirement that notice be given, but this generally is done and the customer
would normally have a chance to state his or her position. There is also an avenue
of complaint through the CRTC, which may intervene and ask Bell Canada not to
terminate services until it investigates. There appears to be no legal duty on Bell
Canada to comply, but principles of comity may induce such compliance.
368 The Dalhousie Law Journal
The developments which have taken place with respect to
landlord-tenant law are matched by the substantial changes taking
place in the extent to which persons have legally recognized rights
associated with jobs. The next section will consider some of these
changes in light of the foregoing discussion.
IV. The Employment Relationship
A working person is seldom his or her own master. The vast
majority of individuals are unable to rely on their own work and
resources to provide a livelihood, and sources of production and the
control of jobs are concentrated in a small segment of the
population. We have, thus, become a society of wage earners, with
the result that the employment relationship is one of the most
important institutional mechanisms in society. The manner in which
the relationship is legally regulated has broad ramifications for the
protection of, and concern and respect for, the worker as an
individual. 95 The worker, through employment, contributes by his
or her productive labour to the welfare of society and, at the same
time, promotes the economic, social, and psychological well-being
of the individual. An increasing number of commentators are
calling for recognition of the "universal and equal property right in
employment." ' 96 Because employment not only provides the basis
for individual subsistence, but also fulfills deep psychological
needs, the demands to construct legal guarantees of security will
undoubtedly have profound implications on one's assessment of
fundamental values. What will be attempted here is a survey of
some of the developments which are responding to these claims for
greater security. 
97
95. Langille, Labour Law is a Subset of Employment Law (1981), 31 U.T.L.J.
200, 202.
96. Beatty, "Labour is Not a Commodity", in B. Reiter, J. Swan, eds., Studies in
Contract Law 313, 317. See also Meyers, Ownership of Jobs: A Comparative
Study 16 (1964): P. Selznick, Law, Society and Industrial Justice 203 (1969);
McLintock, Enterprise Labour and the Developing Law of Employee Job Rights -
Part One (1972), 8 Gonz. L. Rev. 40; Looney, Expected Continued Employment
as a Protected Property Right (1976), 22 Loy. L. Rev. 884; Levine, Towards a
Property Right in Employment (1973), 22 Buffalo L. Rev. 108 I.
97. It is possible to characterize a wide range of worker-initiated protests as part of
a great centuries-long movement in defence of rights to subsistence - upheavals
by the workers as industrial change was introduced as a protest against the
usurpation of rights to resources, land, forests, etc., on which subsistence
depended. See F. Piven and R. Cloward, The New Class War 53 (1982).
Property in the Welfare State 369
The devices available to promote the protection of vital interests
in employment are multi-layered. First, the individual relationship
of employment is regarded as being primarily contractual. In the
law of wrongful dismissal, one sees the development of contractual
principles in such a way as to recognize some of the legitimate
claims of individuals to greater security in employment. Second, the
process of collective bargaining has forced management to concede
some of its unilateral prerogative to effectively decide the fate of an
employee with respect to his or her continuation of employment.
Third, the development of legislative standards seeks not merely to
create a floor of rights, but, in some circumstances, to define the
circumstances under which employment can be terminated. Finally,
developing procedural standards of natural justice and fairness
which emphasize the manner in which employment can be
terminated creates a new avenue of protection, especially for the
large numbers who are employees of government.
The contract of employment has come under fierce attack as a
regulating instrument. The tendency of contract law to presentiate
and make as discrete as possible every exchange with which it deals
strips the exchange of its relational characteristics. 98 Leaving the
employer with the unfettered right to end the transaction and the
relationship demonstrates the past failures of contract law to accord
to workers the legitimacy of their claim to identification with the
job, as well as that of their claims to respect and security. Over
time, however, the courts have come to recognize, through the
fictional device of an implied term in the contract of employment,
that workers are often entitled to reasonable notice if their
employment is to be terminated other than for cause. 99 While this in
no way acts as an absolute fetter on the management's right to
discharge, it does force management to at least weigh the costs of
immediate termination' 0 0 against the interest of the employee in
98. Beatty, supra, note 96 at p. 329; MacNeil, The Many Futures of Contracts
(1974), So. Cal. L. Rev. 691.
99. For some of the recent analysis of the developments, see Harrison,
Termination of Employment (1972), 10 Alta L. Rev. 250; D. Harris, Wrongful
Dismissal (2nd ed., 1980); England, Recent Developments in Wrongful Dismissal
Laws and some Pointers for Reform (1978), 16 Alta. L. Rev. 470; Swinton,
"Contract Law and The Employment Relationship: The Proper Forum for
Reform", in B. Reiter, J. Swan, eds., Studies in Contract Law 357; B. Grossman,
The Executive Firing Line (1982); Grossman, Marcus, New Developments in
Wrongful Dismissal Litigation (1982), 60 Can. Bar Rev. 656.
100. Damages for failure to give reasonable notice can be very substantial for
370 The Dalhousie Law Journal
continuing to work, even if it does so only throughout the period of
reasonable notice. Through the use of the "reasonableness"
doctrine, courts are increasingly emphasizing the difficulty of
finding alternative employment as one of the factors which entitles
the worker to a longer period of notice. This focus is an advance for
employees' interests in job security, providing as it does more
realistic protection on discharge than do inflexible periods linked to
job status. 10 1 Nevertheless, there is the continuing assumption that
the employee has no right to continue in the job. If the proper notice
is given, the employee cannot complain of a breach of contract, and
even if there has been a breach, reinstatement is not normally an
available remedy. '
0 2
Several other facets of the contractual doctrine in employment are
worth mentioning. First, because of the problems of the inequality
of bargaining power, it is always open to the employer, at the time
the relationship commences, to specify the length of notice to which
an employee is entitled. The courts have proved flexible in evading
such clauses, 10 3 recognizing that, with the passage of time and the
continuation of the relationship, the employees' legitimate
expectations and identification with respect to the job demand a
longer notice period than may have been set out at the time the
contract was made. Furthermore, the statutory notice periods in the
various employment standards statutes are a minimum only and do
not preclude the court from determining that the employees are
entitled to much longer periods of notice. '
0 4
Another contractual development emphasizing the special
attachment which an employee develops for a job is the awarding of
damages for mental distress when an employee is dismissed without
receiving reasonable notice. '0 5 Such damages are awarded where it
highly paid executives who are entitled to long periods of notice.
101. Swinton, supra, note 99 at p. 367.
102. McWhirter v. University of Alberta (1977), 80 D.L.R. (3d) 609, rev'd on
other grounds (1979), 18 A.R. 145.
103. Chadburn v. Sinclair Canada Oil Co. (1966), 57 W.W.R. 477; Allison v.
Amoco Production Co., [1975] 5 W.W.R. 501; Wallace v. Toronto Dominion
Bank (1981), 39 0.R. (2d) 350.
104. O'Donovan v. Burns Foods Ltd. (1976), 61 D.L.R. (3d) 766 aff'd (1977), 73
D.L.R. (3d) 321 (Sask C.A.).
105. Pilon v. Peugeot Canada Ltd. (1980), 29 O.R. (2d) 711, 114 D.L.R. (3d)
378; Brown v. Waterloo Regional Board of Commissioners of Police (1982), 37
O.R. (2d) 277 (H.C.); Grant v. MacMillan Bloedel Industries Ltd. (1982), 83
C.L.L.C. 14,002.
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can be reasonably foreseeable that they will be caused by the
dismissal of an employee who has been led to believe that heor she
is secure in his or her job. The limitation on the development of the
doctrine is that such damages must be said to be foreseeable at the
time at which the contract is made. With the great mobility of
workers and the rapid change in industry, it might be arguable that it
is unlikely an employee will ever develop expectations of security.
Yet, it becomes clear that if an employee actually has developed,
through the passage of time, an attachment to the job, there will
indeed be great distress if the relationship is abruptly terminated.
From that perspective, such damages are foreseeable at the time the
contract is made. The employer should know that the longer the
relationship is permitted to continue, the greater the severity of the
economic and psychic consequence for the employee who is
wrongfully dismissed. While the courts are unable to fashion,
through contractual principles, a comprehensive scheme for
protecting job security, there is a growing jurisprudence which is
attempting to define situations where employees should be
compensated for the abrupt termination of an employment
relationship.
A much more direct attack on management's unilateral powers of
discharge has been mounted through the collective bargaining
process. By including "just cause" provisions in the collective
agreement, management has effectively conceded that it has no
right to terminate employment in an arbitrary or capricious fashion.
In addition to the substantive protection given to employees, the
power of deciding whether there was in fact just cause for the
employer's actions is transferred to the arbitrator. The grievance
procedure as the chosen method of resolving disputes leads to
changes in the form of personnel management. For example,
disciplinary procedures are created to comply with standards
developed by the arbitrators, who tend to insist on equal punishment
for the same offence, advance notice of company rules, and an
opportunity for employees to explain their conduct before being
disciplined. The rule of the employer gives way to the rule of law
within the workplace,' 0 6 and the employee's sense of security is
heightened to the extent that arbitrary action can be counteracted.
The extent of the protection is evident from a study of discharge
106. Getman, Labour Arbitration and Dispute Resolution (1978-79), 88 Yale L.
Rev. 916,921.
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cases undertaken by Adams. 10 7 Of 645 disciplinary discharges
which were considered by arbitrators in Ontario between 1970 and
1974, the arbitrators found that in 53.5 percent of the cases, there
was not sufficient cause for discharge. In 17.8 percent of the cases
heard, no discipline at all was justified, and in 35.7 percent of the
cases, the arbitrator substituted a lesser penalty than the discharge
chosen by the employer. In many of these cases, the employees
were reinstated. The right to reinstatement is a much more effective
form of redress for the employee, recognizing as it does that
damages cannot adequately compensate for the capricous, arbitrary,
or unjustified sundering of the attachment to the job which one has
developed. Furthermore, when arbitrators reinstated employees to
their positions, the employee was, in the vast majority of situations,
able to reintegrate into the workforce and continue in employment
to the satisfaction of the employer.
The protection of the working person is greatly advanced from
the common law position. But what of the workers who have just
commenced working and who have not yet developed an
expectation to continue employment? Arbitrators and courts have
been struggling to define the rights of probationary employees. The
extent to which the treatment of this class of employee differs from
that of the permanent employee emphasizes the development of
devices to protect more firmly rooted expectations of security.
The concept of the probationary employee has developed
primarily in the context of dismissal for just cause. If the employer
could terminate any employee merely by giving notice,' 08 then the
employer could hire any person on a trial basis, without explicitly
stating such, and there would be no great bar to letting the person
go. But where there are just cause provisions, the employer may
push for creating the special category of probationary employee.
Unions have been willing to agree that the employer should exercise
discretion in hiring and should have an opportunity to evaluate an
employee before making a long-term commitment. However, the
issue is whether the fate of probationary employees is to be left
entirely to the discretion of the employer or if there is a limit to be
107. Adams, G., Grievance Arbitration of Discharge Cases: A Study of the
Concepts of Industrial Disciplines and their Results (1978).
108. For a short-term employee, the notice period would be relatively short, since
one of the factors considered in determining reasonable notice is the length of
employment; Bardal v. Globe & Mail Ltd., [1960] O.W.N. 253, 24 D.L.R. (2d)
140 (H.C.).
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placed on the employer's unilateral right to terminate. The answer
turns both on statutory provisions which provide for the final
determination of disputes arising under a collective agreement to be
settled by arbitration'0 9 and on the particular wording of the
collective agreement. A number of recent decisions have held that
the legislation prohibits a probationary employee from being denied
access to arbitration in order to dispute a dismissal. 110 The basic
approach in these cases seems to be that if the collective agreement
guarantees a right, then the parties to the agreement are constrained,
by the legislation, from denying any class of employees access to
adjudication if the right is allegedly violated. Another approach
suggests that one must look to the intention of the parties, and if the
working of the collective agreement clearly demonstrates an
intention to deny the access of a probationary employee to
arbitration, then effect must be given to such intention."'
However, even if the collective agreement specifies that the
dismissal of probationary employees is within the discretion of the
employer, some arbitrators have held that there is an implied
promise that the employer will not exercise such discretion in bad
faith' 2 or in a discriminatory manner.
While probationary employees cannot be prevented from having
their disputes arbitrated, the extent of their rights may be less than
that of permanent employees. In particular, the just cause standard
may be considerably relaxed, so that the termination of a
probationary employee will not be set aside unless the decision is
arbitrary, discriminatory, or made in bad faith."13 The emphasis is
on the bona fide expectation of an employee to be treated at least
fairly. The courts appear, at present, to be moving towards a policy
that employees should be entitled to procedural protection."
4
109. For example, Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 228, s. 44(1).
110. Re Toronto Hydro-Electric Systems and CUPE, Local 1 (1980), 29 O.R. (2d)
18 (Div. Ct.) aff'd 30 O.R. (2d) 64 (C.A.); International Association of
Firefighters, Local 268 v. City ofHalifax (1982), 82 C.L.L.C. 14, 167 (N.S.S.C.
A.D.).
111. Re Dominion Stores Ltd. and Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union
Local 414 et al. (1981), 128 D.L.R. (3d) 262 (Ont. Div. Ct.); Peel Board of
Education (1982), 4 L.A.C. (3d) 409 (Beck); Gulf Canada Limited (1981), 28
L.A.C. (2d) 340 (Palmer).
112. Consolidated-Bathuist Packaging Ltd. (St. Thomas Division) (1981), 1
L.A.C. (3d) 10 (Adams).
113. Pacific Western Airlines Ltd. (1981), 30 L.A.C. (2d) 68.
114. The courts frequently conclude that a person is not a probationary employee
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Underlying this move is the attitude that the employment
relationship is of such a nature that the employer should no longer
fully control its termination. This policy is still only in its formative
stages. Many steps will be taken in a backwards direction, but even
more will be taken forward as a coherent theory of the protection of
vital interests emerges.
Even for unorganized workers, a number of jurisdictions have
greatly expanded the protection and remedies available to
employees. Nova Scotia was the first province to grant statutory
protection against unreasonable discharge. 115 The usefulness of the
provision was limited by the fact that it was available only to
employees with ten or more years of seniority. Subsequently, the
Canada Labour Code 1 6 and the Quebec Labour Standards Act"
17
have been amended to include similar provisions, with federal
statutory protection available to employees with one year's
employment, while the Quebec provision applies only after five.
There has already been extensive experience under the federal
legislation which indicates that it is, for the most part,
successful."l 8 The statutes recognize the inadequacy of present
common law developments with respect to wrongful dismissal and
establish a substantive right similar to that achieved through
collective bargaining, as well as a procedural mechanism for
adjudication claimed violations.
Other forms of protection have also been created by statute.
Labour relations legislation prevents an employer from terminating
or otherwise discriminating against an employee because of
legitimate union activities. 1 19 Human rights legislation prohibits
discriminatory actions on a number of grounds, the specifics of
which vary somewhat from province to province. 1 20 Employees
making claims under workers' compensation statutes are also
and is, thus, entitled to just cause protection; Town ofKentville v. Kentville Police
Association (1981), 47 N.S.R. (2d) 374 (S.C.A.D.); Emms v. The Queen (1979),
102 D.L.R. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.);Martin v. Wright (1981), 33 A.R. 354 (Q.B.).
115. Labour Standards Code, S.N.S. 1972, c. 10, s. 67A as am. S.N.S. 1975, c.
50, s. 4.
116. R.S.C. 1970, c. L-1, s. 61.5 as am.
117. S.Q. 1979, c. 45, s. 124, as am.
118. England, Unjust Dismissal in the Federal Jurisdiction: The First Three Years
(1982), 12 Man. L.J. 9; Langille, supra, note 95.
119. For example, Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 228, s. 66.
120. For example, Human Rights Code, S.O. 1981, c. 53, s. 4.
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protected' 2  and employment standards legislation 122 prohibits
retaliatory action by an employer when a person files a claim
pursuant to the statute. In most of these situations, reinstatement is a
possible remedy and the statutory framework may act as a catalyst
for the development of such a remedy at common law.
123
It is not only through prohibitions of dismissal that statutes
explicitly recognize the security interests of a worker in
employment. Provisions for periods of notice and, particularly, for
severance pay recognize the need to aid employees in adjusting to
the loss of jobs. Thus, severance pay can be viewed as
compensation for the expropriation of the rights which the employee
had acquired in the course of the job.' 24 Underlying the job
protection approach is a scheme of social security which provides
unemployment insurance benefits, job creation and retraining
schemes, pension benefits, and, in the last resort, welfare. It is
beyond doubt that, in times of rapid chance, neither the government
nor the economy will succeed in providing continuous employment
for all. Guaranteeing security in the job itself is an unrealistic goal.
It also raises fundamental questions as to why the interests of those
who have been fortunate enough to acquire jobs should be deemed
to be more deserving of protection than the interests of those who
want to work, but cannot find jobs. To characterize jobs as property
drives one back to the question of why one person is justified in
claiming power over a scarce resource which others would also like
to share.
For those employees who are employed by the state, there are a
number of special factors worth considering. One problem lies in
distinguishing between two roles of the state: it acts as the employer
of vasts numbers of persons, but is also the most basic institution of
121. See P. Weiler, Reshaping Workers' Compensation for Ontario 64 (1980) and
Government of Ontario, White Paper on the Workers Compensation Act 58 (1981).
No explicit provision is contained in the Ontario statute, but it is probable that such
discrimination is covered by the Human Rights Code, S.O. 1981, c. 53, s.4.
122. Employment Standards Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 137, s.57.
123. See, supra, note 102.
124. Mac Neil, Plant Closings and Workers' Rights (1982), 14 Ott. L. Rev. 1,
27-37. In Ballard et al v. The Canadian Fishing Co. Ltd. (1982), 83 C.L.L.C.
14,008 (B.C.S.C.), an employer who had contractually bound itself to make
severance payments was required to do so, although employees were taken on by a
successor employer. The only loss suffered by the employees was loss of seniority,
but that is sufficient to justify the severance payment. See also Sloan v. Union Oil
Co. of Canada Ltd. (1955), 16 W.W.R. 225.
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developed society for accomplishing the task of governing. To the
extent that a worker has claims against, and duties toward, the state,
both as an employee and as a citizen, his or her position may differ
significantly from that of an employee who works for a private
employer. The term "government employee" is vague and could
characterize holders of office at pleasure, holders of office who can
only be dismissed for certain definable reasons, 125 or persons who
serve pursuant to contracts of employment. The term is made even
more vague by the fact that such persons might be employed by
government departments, semi-autonomous government agencies,
administrative boards created by statute, crown corporations, etc.
Until recently, the dichotomy between the legal protection and
the actual security enjoyed by public service employees was
astonishing.' 2 6 At common law, crown servants were subject to
dismissal at the pleasure of the Crown; 127 no advance notice or
reasons for termination were required. Apparently, this rule
originally developed with respect to military personnel, but was
later extended to include the general civil service as well. Its legal
basis may have been an extension of the Crown's prerogative
powers over military service, the ground that there was no contract
between the Crown and the servant, 128 or an implied term in the
contract of employment that the relationship could be terminated at
will. 129 Even if the relationship could have been characterized as
contractual, the Crown may not have been able to contract, without
statutory authorization, 130 on any basis other than at pleasure. In the
125. These classifications were adopted by Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964]
A.C. 60, 65 (H.L.), to consider what rights a person might have to the exercise of
natural justice before dismissal. According to Lord Reid, if it was a pure case of
master and servant or where an office is simply held at pleasure, there is no duty on
the person having the power to dismiss to disclose reasons or give an opportunity to
be heard.
126. H. Wade, Administrative Law 62 (4th ed., 1977).
127. P. Hogg, Liability of the Crown 150 (1971). See, for example, Dunn v. The
Queen, [1896] 1 Q.B. 116, where a civil servant who had been hired for a
three-year term brought an action after being dismissed before the end of the term.
It was held that there must be imported into the contract of employment a term that
the Crown may put an end to the employment at its pleasure, in order to protect the
public interest. Thus, unless a statute otherwise provided, the Crown was incapable
of contracting on terms other than at pleasure.
128. Blair, The Civil Servant -A Status Relationship (1958), 21 Mod. L. R. 265.
129. Richardson, Incidents of the Crown-Servant Relationship (1955), 33 Can.
Bar Rev. 424.
130. Supra, note 125.
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absence of explicit statutory provisions which limit the power of the
state to terminate its employees in its own unfettered discretion, the
courts continue to apply the concept of service at pleasure.
1 31
Statutes which regulate employment in the public service tend to
reinforce the underlying common law approach by providing that
service is at pleasure, 13 2 subject, of course, to explicit statutory
provisions to the contrary.
The common law position of civil service employees has been
redefined to an enormous extent. In the Canadian federal
jurisdiction, the primary sources of the redefinition are the Public
Service Employment Act 133 and the Public Service Staff Relations
Act.1 34 The former primarily regulates appointments, promotions,
and transfers in the public service, with merit as the primary
selection criterion. These tasks are performed under the auspices of
the Public Service Commission. The focus of the latter statute is the
system of collective bargaining in the public sector. The Public
Service Employment Act states that the tenure of civil service
employees is at the pleasure of Her Majesty, is subject to the act or
to other acts or regulations, and, unless some other period of
employment is specified, tenure is for an indeterminate period.
135
The act specifies a number of ways in which employment may be
terminated, including resignation, abandonment (unexcused ab-
sence for a period of one week), 136 rejection for cause of a
probationary employee, layoff for lack of work, or discontinuance
of a function, expiration of a term contract, 13 7 and release for
incompetence.138 Where termination occurs for the latter reason, an
131. See, for example, McKnight v. The Province of New Brunswick (1978), 21
N.B.R. (2d) 297; Re Bondarchuk and Administrator of Yukon (1981), 127 D.L.R.
(3d) 467 (Y.T.C.A.);Kedward v. The Queen, [1973] F.C. 1142.
132. Public Service Employment Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. P-32, s. 24; Interpretation
Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 219, s. 21.
133. R.S.C. 1970, c. P-32 as am.
134. R.S.C. 1970, c. P-35 as am.
135. R.S.C. 1970, c. P-32, s. 24.
136. See Perry v. Public Service Commission Appeal Board, [1980] 1 F.C. 57
(C. A.).
137. See Morin v. The Queen, [1981] F.C. 3 (C.A.), where a successful action
brought before the Trial Division of the Federal Court challenging the Deputy
Minister's declaration of abandonment was overturned by the Court of Appeal.
138. See Snaauw v. Public Service Commission Appeal Board, [1980] 1 F.C. 78,
where the dismissal of an employee for incompetence was upheld, although
evidence of the incompetence was gathered during the employee's probationary
period.
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employee has the right to appeal to a board established by the Public
Service Commission. This guarantees the procedural protection of a
hearing in order to ensure that the reason for release is actually
incompetence or incapacity. When termination occurs for some
other reason, an employee may be entitled to a hearing under the
following circumstances. In the federal sector, most employees are
governed by collective agreements and can use the grievance
arbitration procedure to have decisions on termination reviewed,
although collective bargaining is effectively precluded from dealing
with matters that come within the statutory mandate of the Public
Service Commission. 139 However, if discipline is given as the
primary basis for the employer's action against an employee, then
that would fall within the scope of the collective agreement.
Furthermore, individual employees have a right, under the Public
Service Staff Relations Act, to grieve the interpretation, or
application to them, of any provision of any statute or regulation
concerning terms and conditions of employment. If the dispute is
over a disciplinary action resulting in discharge, suspension, or
financial penalty, the employee can refer the grievance to
adjudication. The right of employees to have their termination of
employment reviewed turns on whether the dismissal is for a
disciplinary purpose. 140 These procedures can provide some
protection even for the probationary employee, in that he or she may
attempt to establish that the true cause for rejection was the
discipline of the employee, rather than an assessment of the
employee's unsuitability for the position. '41
The highest courts have had to interpret the scope of the
legislative provisions, weighing the rights of employees to have
employment against the need of the government employer to enjoy
flexible exercise of the merit principle. For example, in Emms v.
The Queen, 142 it was held that the probationary period could not be
extended and that regulations so authorizing were ultra vires the
139. Public Service Staff Relations Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. P-34, s. 56(2).
140. Joliffe, Adjudication in the Canadian Public Service (1974), 20 McGill L.J.
351, 360.
141. Jacmain v. Attorney General of Canada (1977), 81 D.L.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.).
The same result may not apply where a collective agreement expressly excludes the
probationary employee from the protection of the dismissal for cause provisions of
the collective agreement; The Queen in Right of New Brunsivick v. Leeming, [1981]
1 S.C.R. 129.
142. (1979), 102 D.L.R. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.).
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statute. And in Kelso v. The Queen,' 43 it was declared that a
regulation prevented the government from transferring an employee
out of his position because it had been declared bilingual and he was
only unilingual. In Nova Scotia Government Employees Association
et al v. Civil Service Commission of Nova Scotia, 144 the court found
that the Crown, faced with the provincial statute permitting
collective bargaining, no longer retained unimpaired power to
dismiss, at pleasure, employees who are covered by a collective
agreement. As Laskin stated:'
4 5
The law in Canada, in Canadian provinces as well as in other
common law jurisdictions has gone far down the road to
establishing a relative equality of legal position as between the
Crown and those with whom it deals, too far in my opinion to
warrant reversion to an anachronism . . . . At best, in my view,
the power to dismiss at pleasure could be regarded as an implied
term of an engagement which contained no contrary provision.
In addition to the collective bargaining and statutory protection
given to employees in government service, the courts are
developing another remedial device: the duty imposed upon
administrative decision-makers to exercise their functions fairly.
Thus, in Re Nicholson and Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Board of
Commissioners of Police, 146 a probationary police constable, who
was dismissed from employment and who was not informed of the
reasons or given an opportunity to be heard, was held to be
improperly dismissed. In Re Proctor and Board of Commissioners
of Police of City of Sarnia, 147 the dismissal of a constable by a chief
of police was nullified because, it was held, only the Board of
Police Commissioners can exercise the power to dismiss - a
subsequent ratification was insufficient. In McCarthy v.
Attorney-General of Canada, 148 the removal of the appellant from a
qualification list for a position was held invalid because the
appellant had not received notice of the reason for so doing, nor was
she given a chance to be heard. However, the courts are much more
143. [1981]1 S.C.R. 199.
144. (1981), 119D.L.R. (3d) I(S.C.C.).
145. lbid, at 2.
146. (1978), 88 D.L.R. (3d) 671 (S.C.C.). See also Re Brown & Waterloo Police
Commissioners (1979), 26 O.R. (2d) 746 (Div. Ct.); Re Gillingham and Metro
Toronto Police Commission Board (1979), 26 O.R. (2d) 77; Kentville v. Kentville
Police Association (1981), 47 N.S.R. (2d) 374 (S.C.A.D.).
147. (1980), 116 D.L.R. (3d) 577 (S.C.C.).
148. [1981] F.C. 309 (C.A.).
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reluctant to guarantee fair procedures where the alleged basis for
decision is the security risk of the individual. 1
49
While the protection to be obtained through the development of a
duty to proceed fairly may not alter the substantive rights of the
employee, 1 50 the extensive legislative and contractual provisions,
combined with a right to receive reasons and be heard before
termination of employment, does provide substantial protection.
The purpose of requiring a decision-maker to abide by certain
procedural standards is to ensure that the person affected has at least
an opportunity to explain and justify his or her conduct and to
correct any mistaken information on which action would otherwise
be taken. It is no longer only the judicial or quasi-judicial decision
which requires procedural fairness, but also administrative
decisions which are made by government bodies and which affect,
in the employment context, the security interests of the worker.
It is worth noting that this development has taken place without
characterizing the employees' interest in retaining their jobs as
being proprietary in nature. The heralding of "new property"
developments in the United States has been attributable, in part, to a
series of Supreme Court decisions concerning due process
requirements before the termination of public employees.151 Of the
four principle cases, two involved the termination of professors at
state-funded universities, one involved a federal government
employee, and one involved an officer of a municipal police force.
In these cases, the court stated that the constitutional right to due
process is available only if one of the protected interests of life,
liberty, or property, as set out in the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendments, is endangered. The court had originally interpreted
the "life, liberty, or property" phrase as a unit and had given an
open-ended functional interpretation, which meant that the
government could not seriously hurt you without due process of
law. 152 The extent of the procedural protection available would, of
course, vary with the seriousness of the harm and the usefulness or
149. Lee v. Attorney General of Canada (1981), 38 N.R. 347 (S.C.C.).
150. See Mullan, Natural Justice and Fairness - Substantive as Well as
Procedural Standards for the Review of Administrative Decision-Making? (1982),
27 McGill L.J. 250.
151. Board of Regents v. Roth (1972), 408 U.S. 564; Perry v. Sindermann (1972),
408 U.S. 593; Arnett v. Kennedy (1974), 416 U.S. 134;Bishop v. Wood (1976),
426 U.S. 341.
152. J.H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 19 (1980).
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feasibility of particular procedures. At present, however, it is
necessary to show that some particular interest is being affected. In
characterizing expectations of continued employment as a property
right, the court has so narrowly defined the term that, unless
underlying state or federal law clearly establishes an entitlement,
there is no guarantee of due process. The outcome is that the
employee is left without protection in a vast range of cases, due to
the difficulty in establishing the property interest. 1 53 The better
approach would be to use the seriousness of the harm inflicted to
decide whether fair procedures should be used.
Application of the duty to act fairly may have ramifications for
nongovernment employers as well. There is scope for arbitrators to
require that an employer act fairly in exercising its managerial
prerogative.' 5 4 Another possibility is that an employer will be
required to give an employee a fair hearing before a discharge
decision is made. The extent to which arbitrators continue their
novel application of principles to limit arbitrary conduct by an
employer and to protect security interests of employees remains to
be seen.
V. Conclusion
These reviews of the residential landlord-tenant relationship and the
employment relationship demonstrate the changing focus of the
law. The law does not deny the property rights of the landlord or the
employer, but, rather, it balances those rights against the rights of
the individual to security in housing and employment. To
characterize the greater attention given to the rights of these groups
as creating "new property" is not necessarily helpful.1 55 The rights
153. Van Alstyne, Cracks in "the New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in
the Welfare State (1977), 62 Cornell L. Rev. 445.
154. Re Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto and Toronto Civic Employees'
Union Local No. 43 (1978), 79 D.L.R. (3d) 249 (Ont. Div. Ct.); Re Falconbridge
Nickel Mines Ltd. and Brunner et al (No. 2) (1980), 111 D.L.R. (3d) 386 (Ont.
Div. Ct.) aff'd (1981), 129 D.L.R. (3d) 561 (C.A.); but cf Re Metropolitan
Toronto Board of Commissioners of Police and Metropolitan Toronto Police
Association (1981), 124 D.L.R. (3d) 684 (Ont. C.A.).
155. See, however, Michelman, Process and Property in Constitutional Theory
(1981), 30 Cleve. St. L. Rev. 577, where an argument is made for considering
property rights as being procedural, rather than substantive. In this context,
"procedural" means that property is "an ingredient in the constitution of the
individual as a participant in the life of the society, including not least the society's
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which are being protected transcend the boundaries of property talk
and go to the core of the fundamental essence of a right to life and
full participation in a democratic society. The shortcoming of such
protection is that the law is merely guaranteeing some form of
security for those who have already acquired a share of the basic
resources of society. There is a need to recognize that, if
fundamental rights are to have any meaning, they must, above all,
protect the claims of the poor to share in those resources, so that
they can sustain a meaningful existence. 1
56
processes for regulating the conditions of an ineluctably social existence" (p. 588).
This accords with MacPherson, supra, note 40.
156. Samek, Untrenching Fundamental Rights (1982), 27 McGill L. J. 733, 755.
